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Privacy and the mashrabiya screen:





This paper is offered to demonstrate the value of  legal objects in the consideration of  key legal concepts. In it
I indicate the opportunities presented by an encounter with Susan Hefuna’s large Mashrabiya Screen artwork
in the British Museum to supplement, criticise and disrupt current thinking and attitudes towards the concept
of  privacy. In contrast to the increasingly contested and transactional nature of  contemporary understandings
of  this concept, in which privacy is sometimes imagined just as one more complex function in the reasonable
management of  dataflows, Hefuna’s screen can help to articulate and support a different approach to privacy.
This approach is Privacy by Design, and through a consideration of  the physicality of  Hefuna’s work, together
with her own artistic ambition, my claim is that her art object helps to make the alternative approach to privacy
manifest and tangible, prompting a reappraisal of  the proper scope and nature of  privacy protection. 
Keywords: privacy; Privacy by Design; data flows; screens; Susan Hefuna.
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&partId=1>
Introduction
In this brief  paper my general aim is simple: to demonstrate some of  the ways in whichreflection on a single object can help to articulate and reappraise a topic of  current
interest in legal scholarship. That topic is privacy, and the object is a physical mashrabiya
screen created by the artist Susan Hefuna,1 held in the British Museum and entitled
Knowledge is Sweeter than Honey.
In some ways the links between object and topic are obvious and perhaps even appear
trivial. It is obvious and intuitive, for example, that screens promote privacy, precisely
because you cannot easily see through them. It also seems obvious that screens hinder
privacy because a hidden observer can peer out at unsuspecting activity from beyond their
cover. However, law and legal scholarship have recently played a primary role in the
marginalisation of  robust and intuitive understandings of  privacy such as those in play
here. Instead, in multiple jurisdictions and through multiple legal cases and instruments,
the notion has become nebulous and gradable, ‘a difficult and complex concept’ whose
instances are difficult to identify, to be found either broken down into myriad types and
kinds, or cast simply as another transaction cost or marker in the algorithms that govern
complex data flows. My claim is that Hefuna’s screen physically reminds us of  the
intuitive absolutes that until recently were taken to characterise the concept and which are
now in danger of  being left behind. In fact, the specific jurisprudential aim of  this paper
is to show how Hefuna’s screen helps articulate a different approach to privacy in law, in
which privacy is not a rather shapeless concern in the reasonable management of  data
flows, but is a robust value that needs to be ‘baked into’2 the hardware and technology
that people actually use. In short, this paper uses Hefuna’s screen in support of  ‘Privacy
by Design’.
A few qualifications are needed before my essay can begin. First, I make no distinction
in what follows between matters that bear on pedagogy (i.e. using Hefuna’s screen to
promote student understanding and reflection on privacy) and scholarship (i.e. the
production of  new academic research on privacy and related matters). This is because the
insight and opportunity offered by the reflection in question are of  value to both, as I
hope will become apparent as discussion proceeds. As Hannan et al observe, ‘facing
students with an unknown object and asking them to deduce what they can from its
physical form, encourages just the sort of  analysing and hypothesizing that are the life
forces of  scholarly enquiry’.3 This is precisely my methodological ambition in putting
Hefuna’s screen to use and holds as much for academic researchers as for student
learning. Indeed, underpinning my approach is a single thesis, as applicable to scholarship
as to learning and teaching. The thesis is that asking familiar questions (here, about the
concept of  privacy in law) in the context of  an object-instance (a wooden art object in a
gallery in the British Museum) allows a development of  ideas that is not readily available
in more typical treatments of  privacy either through metaphysical generalities (so,
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1     For bibliographic information on the artist – Susan Hefuna – see <www.susanhefuna.com>.
2     The phrase ‘baked into’ and similar is often used in discussion of  privacy by design to suggest the need to
ensure privacy settings are embedded into the process or product that they are ‘so deeply baked-in they cannot
be turned off ’. See A Cavoukian and J Jonas, Privacy by Design in the Age of  Big Data (Information and Privacy
Commissioner of  Ontario, Canada 2012) 2. 
3     L Hannan, R Duhs and H Chatterjee, ‘Object-based Learning: A Powerful Pedagogy for Higher Education’,
in Jos Boys, Museums and Higher Education Working Together: Challenges and Opportunities (Routledge 2016) 165.
theorising the concept of  privacy in the abstract),4 or through the routine sites for its
application (thus, the textbook cases and other sites of  its legal contestation).5 In this way
I aim to use both Hefuna’s screen to urge a pause in the current theorising (away) of
privacy in law, and also to use the platform of  privacy in law to press the merit of  using
museum and other objects to analyse and hypothesise in the legal arena, exactly as
Hannan et al propose. I take both of  these aims together as the discussion proceeds.
My argument is set out over the following three sections, each offered, fittingly
enough, as a ‘screen’. I want to call screens to mind throughout, which is one thing that an
encounter with Hefuna’s screen naturally presses on an observer. Each screen works in
just the way Hefuna’s does in the British Museum – both presented as an object in its own
right, but also as a fixed point of  mediation through which further ideas can be glimpsed,
linked and brought into focus. In this way I set out a procession of  ideas, each tethered
to and prompted by the physical screen in question. So, the first screen presents the object
itself. The second screen is brought into focus – is prompted immediately – by our
encounter with the first and considers Hefuna’s artistic intention in creating the object:
ideas familiar to legal scholarship begin to intrude here. The third and final screen then
moves through the first and second to interrogate the force of  the screen for legal
pedagogy and scholarship, with the focus resting entirely on the presently vexed concept of
privacy. There then follows a brief  conclusion.
Finally, a cautionary note is needed. My claim is not that the ideas on offer can only
be found through consideration of  Hefuna’s artwork, nor is the claim that they are
impossible to establish through more traditional scholarship. I do not claim that Hefuna’s
screen is a uniquely well-placed art object – even within the British Museum – for the
delivery of  the theoretical gains I have in mind. Rather my claim is simply that her screen,
on a tour of  the museum, can be used powerfully in the way I present. This, of  course,
is a strength rather than a weakness in regard to my general support for the use of
museum artefacts for theoretical purposes. However, it would be a mistake to imagine
from these caveats that the approach I set out is just a colourful tangent or adjunct to
more worthwhile scholarship. We shall see that the method of  engaging with Hefuna’s
physical object broadens the scope and reach of  existing analytic approaches to privacy,
in turn enabling a test and critique of  the fitness for purpose of  existing legal
understandings of  that concept.
Screen 1: object
The object in question is a work by the German-Egyptian artist Susan Hefuna. It is a
wooden mashrabiya screen of  five panels, of  which three contain words written in Arabic.
Created in 2007, the work was acquired by the British Museum in 2008 and is but one
instance in a series of  works by Hefuna – other physical screens, photographs – that take
the mashrabiya screen as their subject. The screen, then, is a representation of  an
Egyptian ‘mashrabiya’ which has its roots in the Arabic phrase for ‘cooling the water:
such screens are a well-known feature of  North African and Arabic architecture’.6
Although their history can be traced further back than the fourteenth century, these
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4     For interesting discussion, see, for example, Daniel Solove. ‘A Taxonomy of  Privacy’ (2005) 154 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 477; and R L Finn, D Wright and M Friedewald, ‘Seven Types of  Privacy’ in
European Data Protection: Coming of  Age (Springer Netherlands 2013) 3–32.
5     See, for example, Murray v Express Newspapers and Another [2007] EWHC 1908 (Ch).
6     An interesting history of  the development of  the mashrabiya in Egyptian architectural culture is provided in
J Mohamed, The Traditional Arts and Crafts of  Turnery or Mashrabiya (Doctoral dissertation, Rutgers University-
Camden Graduate School 2015).
screens became a notable architectural feature in Cairo during this period, becoming part
of  protruding oriel windows, usually on the upper floors of  houses, designed to catch any
breezes to cool pots of  water behind them and, as the mashrabiyas became more ornate
and large, designed to protect the privacy of  the people7 inside. Thus, as Feeny observes
in a significant note:
Later, as they were fitted with cushioned beds running the length and breadth of
the screen, they became comfortable havens in which the occupants could recline
in cool privacy while gazing down at the streets or courtyards below and, unseen
and unheard, share in the life of  the outside world.8
Knowledge is Sweeter than Honey is just one of  Hefuna’s artistic renderings of  such a screen.
Of  the particular work itself  the British Museum says this:
Knowledge is sweeter than honey: Sculpture, window-screen (mashrabiya), made
of  wood stained with black ink. Screen has outer frame and is divided internally
into five ‘windows’. Composed of  numerous lathe-turned elements glued
together to form geometric patterns. Further smaller elements are set within the
three largest windows to form words in Arabic script.
The screen can be viewed by any of  the visitors to the lower ground floor of  the
Sainsbury’s Galleries located within the museum. As an art object it is striking – located
within the African section, it is an imposing and freestanding piece that measures just over
two metres wide and two metres tall, easily one of  the larger objects in the gallery in which
it resides. Its apparently 1:1 ratio with the mashrabiya screens whose form it appropriates
naturally disturbs the borders of  art and artefact – if  you needed such a screen for a house
you could quite easily adopt Hefuna’s for the purpose. Indeed, those unfamiliar with
mashrabiya screens may wonder at the relation between source and art object, between art
and craft, and between facsimile and fake. Visitors to the gallery might begin to wonder
whether the art in Hefuna’s creation lies just in the insertion of  the Arabic text, the rest of
the object perhaps remaining unremarkably standard in form and construction. For now it
is enough to imagine the bulk and heft of  the piece and to realise that the photograph in
the British Museum collection cannot do justice to its physical impact.
As can be seen in Figure 1, Hefuna’s
screen has considerable physical presence,
not least because of  its blackness in an
otherwise light-coloured and well-lit
setting. Interestingly, unlike many of  the
pieces located within this particular gallery,
it is not enclosed in glass. The large screen
stands on a base away from the gallery
walls and is protected by short ropes, thus
allowing observers to walk around the
whole piece unimpeded by any casing. The
ability to view the screen from both sides
and, indeed, walk all around it allows the
observer to break free of  – or
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7     Thoughtful discussion of  the use of  privacy within the construction of  Muslim homes and architecture is
provided in Z Othman, R Aird and L Buys, ‘Privacy, Modesty, Hospitality, and the Design of  Muslim Homes:
A Literature Review’ (2015) 4(1) Frontiers of  Architectural Research 12–23.
8     John Feeney commentary in Saudi Aramco World (July/August 1974 print edition) 32–6, 33.
Figure 1: Hefuna’s mashrabiya screen
Photo by Amanda Perry-Kessaris
problematise – consideration of  which side is the ‘inside’ and which the ‘outside’.9 This
question is not answered, of  course, by the script in the three windows, for the question
then becomes for whom – on which side – is the script written. In any case, many visitors
will likely be unable to identify the side from which the Arabic writing reads intelligibly.
That script resonates with the following lines, taken from Proverbs 24:
My son, eat thou honey, because it is good; and the honeycomb, which is sweet
to thy taste: So shall the knowledge of  wisdom be unto thy soul: when thou hast
found it, then there shall be a reward, and thy expectation shall not be cut off.10
Of  course, much can be made of  Hefuna’s part use of  this Proverb in her artwork, but I
do not aim to pursue these ideas in the current paper: for present purposes my discussion
develops around an encounter with the sheer physicality of  Hefuna’s screen.
Screen 2: Hefuna’s artistic ambition
In considering Hefuna’s artistic intention we are pressed to attend to all the various
dimensions of  the physical object that, as it happens, Hefuna wants us to call to mind.
Hence we must consider the screen from one side, then the other, and finally as an object
itself. Hefuna has said this of  her work with the mashrabiya screen:
In my experience, most human beings are not able to see the world without a
screen of  social and cultural projections. I discovered the shape of  Mashrabiya
screens – windows, blinds, various cultural forms of  architectural elements – in
Cairo. The Mashrabiya protects the inside world from the outside; filtering the
light and cooling the inside space; allowing one to observe without being seen. For
me the Mashrabiya became an abstract symbol that operates in two directions with
the possibility for dialogue, rather than closure. It separates, yet also filters and
joins. It signifies the ‘in-between-ness’ of  being in two cultures at the same time
that it reflects personal experiences dealing with cross-cultural codes.11
Here we can see the elements that enable the screen to be used so effectively as spur to
legal pedagogy and research on privacy. This is because privacy, protecting ‘the inside
world from the outside’ and ‘allowing one to observe without being seen’, is also bound
together with other concerns and interests – it ‘separates but also filters and joins’ and
‘operates in two directions’. As we shall see, in this way Hefuna’s screen begins to present
us with a context for privacy in which many of  the contemporary approaches to that
concept are focused and articulated.
Moreover, in presenting us with a mashrabiya screen Hefuna consciously evokes and
continues a theme in North African art itself, in which such screens were ‘rediscovered by
Hassan Fathy in the 1980s’. Influenced as she and a generation of  artists have been by Fathy,12
Hefuna’s screen can be read as a continuing discourse on the mashrabiya screen and Egyptian
culture – in which these screens have been culturally rehabilitated following their association
with harems in Cairo.13 Moving beyond Fathy, Hefuna tells us that her deployment of  the
screen is an abstract symbol for her own (and others’) cultural ‘in-betweenness’, allowing a
‘possibility of  dialogue’ rather than just to bleakly include and exclude.
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9     See Figure 2 below.
10   King James Bible, Proverbs 24:13–14.
11   Bettina Mathes, ‘Interview with Susan Hefuna’ (Flash Art 12 November 2010) <www.flashartonline.com/
2010/11/tell-me-what-you-draw-and-i-will-tell-you-who-you-are-interview-with-susan-hefuna>.
12   See Hassan Fathy, Natural Energy and Vernacular Architecture (UN University 1986).
13   For further discussion see Mohamed (n 6).
These various links and associations have not gone unnoticed by art critics and
cultural historians. In a catalogue for an exhibition of  Hefuna’s work the significance of
standpoint and context for Hefuna’s mashrabiya are also picked out as significant:
Like a second skin, the Mashrabiya protects what is often most endangered in the
encounter with the Other: the recognition of  the differences that unite us.
Mashrabiya: a shutter that doesn’t expose.14
These remarks are arresting, particularly when set against contemporary technical
(including legal) treatments of  privacy in which the increasingly transactional deployment
of  the notion is strangely at odds with its value as ‘a second skin’ or ‘shutter that doesn’t
expose’. But in a more nuanced assessment Nat Muller writes of  Hefuna’s creation:
Place a mashrabiya, in which words and phrases in German, Arabic and English
are incorporated, in a gallery space and the one-way vision of  inside looking out
is scrambled and codes of  what is private and public become confused. The
vantage point of  the viewer, both with regard to positioning in the actual space
and to geo-ethnic context, becomes central to the work.15
Hefuna herself  has recognised (and is interested in) the varied responses to her work that
have thus resulted from the ‘in-betweenness’ and scrambled coding that her work evokes.
She comments that:
I’m aware that people read my work differently, depending on their own cultural
or social context. They only see what they know. In my experience, most human
beings are not able to see the world without a screen of  social and cultural
projections. 
However, in a typical note of  hopefulness, Hefuna does not read these dynamics as
necessarily negative, recalling again that the ‘mashrabiya became a symbol that operates
in two directions with the possibility for dialogue and awareness’.16
It is a notable feature of  her study through mashrabiya that Hefuna intends both a
projection of  her own position of  cultural in-betweenness through the screen, but also
intends to call to mind and stimulate more universal themes of  privacy, closure,
mediation, context and dialogue. At times, even she has been surprised by the significance
of  context for the viewer. Speaking of  differing responses to an earlier work she observes
that, in Cairo:
One of  my digital photographs of  a Mashrabiya screen was instantly perceived
as a familiar object. By contrast, all Western audiences had associated it with the
Western concept of  abstract art. This first-hand and unexpected feedback from
Egypt was a complete surprise to me. A different audience saw the essence of
the work and not its reflection, without having read any of  my intentions or
knowing anything about my background. From then on, my work was somehow
enriched by this dual feedback: the historical, scientific, and aesthetic context of
the work perceived by a Western eye, and the references that were immediately
related to familiar surroundings by Egyptians. The reading of  the work depended
on the codes of  each culture, the same form could refer to different ideas and
images from the past and the present.17
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14   ‘Knowledge Is Sweeter than Honey’ (Catalogue Essay for Exhibition: Hefuna @ Vienna 2010, Galerie Grita
Insam 2010).
15   Nat Muller, ‘Making Things Permeable: Susan Hefuna’ (2015) – interview available at
<http://susanhefuna.com/biography/43/press/>. 
16   Alex Greenberger, ‘Susan Hefuna on Mingling East and West in her Art’ (Interview: Art Space 17 September
2013) <www.artspace.com/magazine/interviews_features/artist_to_watch/susan_hefuna-51606>.
17   Mathes (n 11).
Nat Muller, again, thus records the impact of  Hefuna’s mature work, of  which Knowledge is
Sweeter than Honey is a prominent piece:
In her work Susan Hefuna masterfully turns inside into outside and vice versa.
What often remains unanswered is what exactly constitutes this inside and
outside, where it is located, and whose inside and outside it is to start with. The
openness to these questions is precisely what makes Hefuna’s practice so
intriguing and multi-faceted from a conceptual and a formalist perspective.18
In Muller’s summing-up we can already
perceive the potential that Hefuna’s screen
presents for pedagogy and research on the
concept of  (and so the instances of)
privacy in law. Thus we move through a
physical object itself  (Screen 1) and
through Hefuna’s ambition (Screen 2) to
appreciate that her piece acts, and is
intended to act, as a prompt to reflection
on the shifting and multilayered dynamics
of  screens, in which closure, privacy,
inclusion and exclusion become in the
same instant meeting-points, filters, points
of  mediation and opportunities for
dialogue. For Hefuna herself, the
mashrabiya presents a point of  intersection spanning her divided cultural heritage. In
short, her screen brings together many of  the most significant elements of  contemporary
analysis of  privacy in legal and other technical domains. At the very least, then, an
encounter with her screen in the gallery begins to articulate and individuate ideas about
privacy that run from simpler modal definitions (‘a shutter that doesn’t expose’) to the
complexities of  context and contingency in which shifting standpoint is critical.
Screen 3: privacy, law and the screen
We are now in a position to use the artefact in Screen 1 and artistic ambition in Screen 2
to focus down on the legal conceptual issues that emerge in the encounter with Hefuna’s
mashrabiya screen art object. Here, the idea remains that her screen can act as a prompt
to further reflection on the concept of  privacy, or might even help to articulate that
concept, or can open avenues for criticism and refinement of  existing treatments and
understandings of  the notion.
One of  the powerful ways in which Hefuna’s art object helps to approach privacy is
that it is sophisticated. Privacy might find a representation in other objects in the Museum
– for example, a lock and key,19 or cabinet with secret panels,20 or an Egyptian
sarcophagus.21 Knowledge is Sweeter than Honey is better placed than these, however, because
– as we saw in the previous screen – her mashrabiya is both a material shutter and a point
of  intersection, of  mediation and dialogue. For these reasons, it is particularly well suited
to claim the attention of  those for whom privacy and privacy problems appear (perhaps,
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18   Muller (n 15).
19   For example, a Swedish padlock and key wrought from iron in the nineteenth century, BM Number 0402.4 
a-b, not currently on display.
20   For example, the cabinet which is part of  the Waddesdon Bequest, BM Number WB16, on display G2a/dc1.
21   For example, the Egyptian Sarcophagus from 600 BC found in the ancient Egypt and Sudan section, BM
Number EA17, on display G4/B5.
Figure 2: Inside and outside
Photo by Amanda Perry-Kessaris
appear essentially) to concern the complexities of  the negotiation over spaces and rights,
of  dataflow management and the balancing of  legal and other interests. The legal context
in which Hefuna’s screen can intervene now needs to be set out with more clarity.
The main themes of  contemporary legal approaches to privacy can be captured even
within the limits of  the present brief  piece. Indeed, many of  the relevant papers that have
appeared over the last decade or so begin with useful and accurate summaries of  the
current scope of  privacy analyses. Thus, we find running through the work of  perhaps
the principal contemporary theorist of  privacy, Daniel Solove, readily available synopses
of  the different approaches on offer.22 Thus Solove has noted the prevailing mood
among scholars that privacy is ‘a concept in disarray. Nobody can articulate what it means
. . . Philosophers, legal theorists, and jurists have frequently lamented the great difficulty
in reaching a satisfying conception of  privacy’.23 Opening his own account in
‘Understanding Privacy’, Solove cites Jonathan Franzen, who writes that ‘on closer
examination privacy proves to be the Cheshire cat of  values: not much substance, but a
very winning smile’.24 But Solove also makes careful note of  the high value of  privacy as
recorded in a multitude of  writings. These include that of  Warren and Brandeis25 (privacy
is ‘the right most valued by civilised men’), Gavison (it is ‘essential to democratic
government’), Rachels (noting privacy is critical to ‘our ability to create and maintain
different sorts of  social relationships with different people’) and many others, whilst
noting privacy’s appearance in case law too – for example, in the US case, Lake v Wal-mart
Stores (privacy is ‘integral to our humanity’).26 So there is plainly much at stake in the
understanding of  privacy for legal reasons alone, and this is the site for Robert Post’s
observation, often repeated by Solove himself, that:
Privacy is a value so complex, so entangled with competing and contradictory
dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct meanings, that I sometimes
despair whether it can usefully be addressed at all.27
Despite Post’s despair, many scholars and courts have tried to make better sense of  the
concept, and Solove and others have done much to classify their attempts – usually with
criticism in mind.
Solove’s chief  criticism with the scholarship in question is that it adopts what might
be called an essentialist approach to defining privacy, in which theorists all search for
some common thread running through privacy instances that might then be acclaimed a
necessary marker or attribute of  privacy itself. In Solove’s analysis, the perceived essence
has spanned (at least) the right to be let alone, limited access to the self, secrecy, control
over personal information, personhood and intimacy. But, as Solove proclaims, these
‘countless attempts’28 have foundered on the inability to locate a common denominator,
and this failure prompted Solove himself  to argue for a different approach deriving from
the philosophy of  language of  Ludwig Wittgenstein.29 In this approach we are urged to
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22   Daniel J Solove, ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’ (2002) 90(4) California Law Review 1087; Daniel J Solove,
Understanding Privacy (Harvard University Press 2008); Daniel J Solove, Nothing to Hide, The False Tradeoff  between
Privacy and Security (Yale University Press 2011).
23   Solove, Understanding Privacy (n 22) 1.
24   Ibid. 
25   Samuel D Warren and Louis D Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4(5) Harvard 193. 
26   See Solove, Understanding Privacy (n 22) ch 1.
27   Robert C Post, ‘Three Concepts of  Privacy’ (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2087, 2087.
28   Solove, Understanding Privacy (n 22) 40. 
29   See Ibid ch 3.
give up the idea that meaning always depends upon necessary and sufficient definitional
conditions and to embrace instead – at least for some concepts – the idea that meaning
is more open-textured. For Solove, privacy is a ‘cluster of  many distinct and related
things’,30 ‘an umbrella term that refers to a wide and disparate group of  related things’,31
and is to be theorised by finding ‘a general framework to identify privacy harms or
problems and to understand why they are problematic’.32 Solove’s approach is different,
then, because he conceptualises privacy ‘from the bottom up’,33 and that ‘a focal point for
a theory of  privacy should be the problems we want the law to address’.34 The difficulty
for such a problem-based approach is that these problems seem exponentially on the rise.
Jon Mills expands on the phenomenon in his comment that ‘the reasonable
expectation of  privacy recognized by the law does not keep pace with the varying types
of  information disclosure afforded by the rapidly advancing technologies such as the
Internet, digitally recorded closed circuit television, and mobile communication
devices’.35 The increasing turnover of  operating systems, privacy settings, new hardware
and other sites in which privacy concerns might take hold (for example, online virtual
reality) threaten to leave Solove’s approach as unhelpful as the earlier approaches that
draw on the classical theory of  concepts. In fact, the confusing plurality of  top-down
‘cookie-cutter’ essentialist definitions in Solove’s line of  fire is matched by the increasing
plurality of  privacy-problem instances in Solove’s own treatment, with the resultant
shapelessness of  the notion an inevitable benefit to the technology companies, social
media platforms, advertisers and so on for whom the acquisition of  personal data has
become vital. In fact, it is in this intensely practical arena, rather than in scholarly writing,
that the most significant developments are to be found, and here it is possible to discern
that privacy is increasingly construed as a function of  data and information flow
management.
Thus, the key terminology that often emerges in recent attempts to elucidate the
concept of  privacy is that of  ‘identifiable information’ or ‘personal data’ – reducing the
parameters of  ‘privacy’ itself  to that of  dataflows. Indeed, in a recent co-authored piece
(with Paul Schwarz), Solove notes the central importance, at least to the development of
the legal concept, of  personally identifiable information (PII),36 writing that: ‘The scope
of  privacy laws typically turns on whether PII is involved.’37 And this regulatory
framework is hardly surprising given reliance on and widespread use of, amongst other
things, digital devices. In social and media contexts we see concerns about ‘privacy’
related to social media, medical data and records, biometric identity cards and concern
about the algorithms of  ‘big data’ and the information being collected about individuals’
web use and online preferences by companies and search engines. Indeed, the word
‘screen’ is now more familiar in the context of  digital screens, and ‘screening’ is taken
more often to relate to our use of  such screens rather than to the activity of  filtering out
unwanted intrusion to protect our personal space. These changes have mostly proceeded
imperceptibly and are little remarked upon in the relevant scholarly literature.
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30   Ibid 40.
31   Ibid 41.
32   Ibid 49.
33   Ibid 49.
34   Ibid 75.
35   Jon L Mills, Privacy: The Lost Right (Oxford University Press 2009) 7.
36   P M Schwartz and D J Solove, ‘The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of  Personally Identifiable
Information’ (2011) New York University Law Review 86, 1814. See ‘Abstract’ and particularly 1819.
37   Ibid ‘Abstract’.
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The pragmatic reduction of  privacy first to privacy problems or privacy harms and
then to problems concerning information acquisition and management of  dataflows is an
understandable reaction to technological breakthrough and the inability of  scholars to
deliver a sharp-edged concept of  privacy that can be put to work in legal settings.
However, the perceived shapelessness of  privacy that has resulted has allowed the notion
to figure merely as a transaction cost in the creation of  communication and information
environments. This is precisely what two commentators have recently observed, Mulligan
and King writing:
These plastic, sui generis, built environments give the companies that design
them a privileged role in society. As architects of  the ‘playing fields’ upon which
individuals, and increasingly governments and private sector entities, engage, they
can erect, alter, and obliterate structural barriers that afford or erode privacy
through transaction costs . . . Simply put, they have an unprecedented ability to
reshape privacy norms on a global scale.38
It is in this vexed context of  scholarship, pragmatism and technology that Hefuna’s screen
has the power to disrupt, acting as touchstone and motivation for a critical pedagogy and
scholarly reflection on the notion of  privacy itself. It has been effectively argued that, as
we move to a more transparent society where the lines between ‘private’ and ‘public’ life
are increasingly blurred, we place ‘significant strain on existing privacy concepts and
practices that depend on a boundary between private and public’.39 Hefuna’s screen
makes manifest the boundaries that are, still, possible. It is physical and architectural,
standing for the mashrabiya screens that are built into the walls of  houses in their
vernacular setting. Hefuna’s art object is large, undeniable, and calls to mind absolutes
about privacy that are easily lost in the swirl of  new technologies and algorithms of  big
data. It reminds us that screening can refer to the activity of  protecting and securing –
providing a second skin or shutter that doesn’t expose. To students who live in the
contemporary, transactional information society it might appear to call back to a simpler
time of  absolutes now gone. But the power of  Hefuna’s screen is not merely that of
historical artefact – sarcophagus for an earlier and simpler set of  understandings – for it
also stands as an emblem for a different approach to privacy that has emerged recently as
a counter to the prevailing orthodoxy. This is the approach that is summed under the title
privacy by design.
Privacy by design focuses on ensuring that privacy is a hardwired, default position in
the systems and processes of  platforms we use for our digital interactions. In this
approach, privacy settings and positions must be considered throughout the design of  a
product or system, rather than being an add-on or patch at the end. Thus, ‘Privacy by
design is not a specific technology or product but a systematic approach to designing any
technology that embeds privacy into the underlying specifications or architecture.’40
The idea, championed by Dr Ann Cavoukian,41 Information and Privacy
Commissioner for Ontario, Canada, has gained support in recent years amongst
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41   See A Cavoukian, ‘Privacy by Design. Take the Challenge’ (Information and Privacy Commissioner of
Ontario, Canada, June 2009) or Privacy by Design website of  the Information and Privacy Commissioner’s
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information experts and practitioners. Indeed, internationally, data commissioners have
summarised the approach in a resolution: 
Knowing that with technological advances come new challenges to privacy and
to the ability of  individuals to exercise their information rights effectively;
Accepting that existing regulation and policy alone are not sufficient fully to
safeguard privacy; Recognizing that embedding privacy as the default into the
design, operation and management of  ICT and systems, across the entire
information life cycle, is necessary to fully protect privacy.42
Perhaps even more significantly, privacy by design is about to become enshrined, in the
European Union (EU) at least, in the newly created General Data Practice Regulations
(GDPR) which will take direct effect throughout the EU in April 2018.43 Hefuna’s screen
plainly stands for privacy by design in a material sense, making manifest the non-
negotiable qualities of  hardware-focused privacy protection. In this way the art object
does not ‘support’ privacy by design in a simplistic sense, but rather helps students and
researcher to bring into focus the full scope of  complex issues that are in contention
throughout the debate. After all, privacy that is ‘baked into’ IT and other hardware may
not be attractive to individuals as consumers and certainly not to the companies and
organisations for whom it would present a cost and impediment to their activity. So there
are arguments still to be had.44 Instead, Hefuna’s work, encountered in the museum,
allows us to better appreciate the proper range and possibility of  the concept of  privacy
itself  by calling to mind protection through design – screening as second skin – that until
recently could be taken for granted. The view I offer in this paper is that privacy by design
is significant and welcome not least because, like Hefuna’s screen, it reminds us that until
recently we did not think of  privacy as a relative concept (such as ‘tallness’) that depends
just upon context for its correct extension, but rather as an absolute – though gradable –
concept (such as ‘emptiness’) that can be a closed value at one end.45 These distinctions
are not apparent in current academic literature, and the power of  Hefuna’s screen to
remind us of  them can be of  real importance to contemporary theorising of  the notion.
Hefuna’s art work is also important in another way, already noted above, because of
its multilayered sophistication that was evident in the discussion in Screen 2. Unlike other
objects that might be used, Hefuna’s mashrabiya screen, particularly as presented as art
object in the museum, plays with and unsettles ideas of  inside and outside, inclusion and
exclusion, and the difficult negotiations of  values of  closure and dialogue, privacy and
mediation. Significantly, however, the screen enables us to appreciate that, at least for
some sites of  privacy, these are debates that can run – indeed, can only run – because the
central concept of  privacy is already plainly to be seen, clearing the ground for productive
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discussions about whether privacy is a good thing, or whether it is better to use screens
to exclude than include, or to question who gets to afford such a screen – without miring
these critical social and political questions in the perceived shapelessness of  conceptual
theorising and philosophy of  language. Of  course, Hefuna’s artwork is not the only
museum artefact that can work to such effect, but the opportunity it provides to prompt
these thoughts (particularly, as I have found, standing with others in front of  and behind
it in the gallery) is considerable.
Conclusion
In sympathy with the insight offered by Perry-Kessaris in the introduction to this volume,
Hefuna’s mashrabiya aids legal enquiry by enabling us to visualise and make tangible a
legal issue or problem that otherwise can appear abstract and esoteric. Hefuna’s screen
makes manifest issues of  privacy. However, this is not simply a matter of  making the
concept tangible so that people can better grasp existing issues, for engagement with the
mashrabiya allows us to go further, helping us to locate and refine our existing legal
understandings, and so to better articulate or resolve the problems that have been felt in
this area.
I noted in the introduction that, rather obviously, screens promote privacy, precisely
because you cannot easily see through them, and hinder privacy, because a hidden
observer can peer out at unsuspecting activity from beyond their cover. But though such
robust intuitions seem trivial they nonetheless represent a perspective on privacy that is
becoming marginalised at an increasing and, I think, worrying rate. Knowledge is sweeter
than honey – certainly to many technology giants, advertisers, governmental organisations
and social media platforms – and the present shapelessness of  privacy as a concept has
inevitably served their interests well. Against this drift, Hefuna’s screen is a strong motif
and reminder of  the proper scope of  the concept, whilst making manifest the idea of
privacy by design. And through these things it might also, perhaps, help the case for
rebalancing privacy interests in favour of  citizens.
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